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INTRODUCTION
More than three decades have passed since Law and Contemporary Problems last
presented an issue on the topic of religion in American law. Then as now one
could say with Walter Kaufmann that no subject is more important to human
communities and their commonweal than religion.' Next to other highly visible
signs confirming the truth of that bold generalization in contemporary American
society, one need only attend to the passionate tones in which the writers assembled
here set out their sometimes discordant viewpoints.
In the 1949 issue of this journal John Courtney Murray forthrightly registered
his deliberate use of "a tinge of rhetorical emotion" in discussing the clash of
ideologies and of power in the controversy over religious instruction in the public
schools. 2 In varying states of excitation all eight articles in that installment tangled
with the startling doctrine developed by the Supreme Court in McCollum v. Board
of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) and Everson v.Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947). This year only one of our eight articles tackles what Murray called "the cult
of Diana, the Divine Public School. 3 The questions raised here by Russell Kirk
concerning the false religion of the educationists also animate, in part at least,
James Serritella's scrutiny of the unsatisfactory judicial formulations of the entanglement test as well as the exploration by Thomas Pickrell and Mitchell Horwich of
the nature and desirable degree of partnership between State and Church in
modern democratic society.
The two centrally positioned papers likewise convey a high commitment to their
respective theses. Thus the thread of intense personal conviction unites, in a
paraphrase of a letter to me from Leo Pfeffer, strange bedfellows indeed. E. L.
Hebden-Taylor trenchantly argues that a criminal law sheared from a sense of sin
and individual and collective responsibility has far-reaching implications for society
as a whole. Pfeffer's contribution provides us with an insider's understanding of the
power and effect of the most vocal religious "lobbyists" before the Supreme Court.
The principles of many such groups are assailed by authors who speak earlier in
this issue.
This feature of deeply entrenched disagreement is the substantive fuel for the
fiery rhetoric displayed both by our 1981 and our 1949 commentators. It would
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have been intellectually dishonest to have sought to package the new symposium in
ecumenical wrapping-paper and to decorate it with irenical ribbons. Pfeffer argues
elsewhere that religions are today more similar than they are dissimilar, owing
largely to the triumph of secular humanism. 4 Whether that is accurate or not as a
generalization, in these pages belief does battle with nonreligious (secular) culture,
as I think it still does in our wider life.
It would also be disingenuous to pretend that the Court has much improved on
its jurisprudential theories of the meaning of the Religion Clauses in the First
Amendment in these intervening three decades. The sad disarray in religious
constitutional law continues to give witness to the accuracy of Murray's perspective
in 1949:
No one who knows a bit about the literature on separation of church and state, that
for centuries has poured out in all languages, will be inclined to deny that hardly
another problem in the religious or political order has received so much misconceived and deformed statement, with the result that the number of bad philosophies in the matter is, like the scriptural numbers of fools, infinite. 5
Murray was joined in our earlier issue by, although not necessarily aligned with,
Edward Corwin and Alexander Meiklejohn. Their criticisms of the Court as "National School Board" are widened here by James Hitchcock and Francis Canavan to
an even more fundamental attack on the neutrality dogma embedded in the
standard catechism of the civil religion of the pluralist American state.
As long ago as 1913 Woodrow Wilson warned us in The New Freedom that the
negative notion of freedom as mere insulation from governmental coercion would
create a vacuum that is quickly enough filled by other tyrannies, which then
pervade and direct governmental processes. Kenneth Thompson illuminates our
understanding of aspects of this phenomenon in his examination of the peculiar
moral ambiguity which obtains in such a vacuum. Murray prophesied that the
tyrannies in the area of religious constitutional law would consist of "irreligion,
secularist ideologies, false political and educational philosophies, and the dangerous
myth of 'democracy as a religion"6 and that their hegemony would spell disaster to
our society.
Since my own biases have by now been fervently alluded to or admitted, I must
leave it to the reader to weight the arguments to follow. Each of us can only
measure for himself the eligibility of self and others for inclusion in the scriptural
number of fools; at the same time we might also try to determine how many
more angels will try to dance on the head of the First Amendment pin.
JOYCE
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